The moral error theorist thinks that moral language and moral thinking aim at the truth (i.e., that moral language is assertoric and moral thinking doxastic) but that they systematically fail to secure it. This radical form of moral skepticism takes an attitude towards morality like sensible people take towards astrology, like reasonable people take towards talk of witches, and like atheists take towards religion. The moral error theory clashes not just with common sense, but with an unusually precious chunk of common sense, the undermining of which many people contemplate with deep unease. It is no surprise, then, that the error theorist faces opposition at every turn. Stephen Finlay [2008] joins the ranks of opposition with his recent paper “The error in the error theory”—not only inviting a rejoinder from the error theorist, but more-or-less forcing the skeptic’s hand in choosing a title for that rejoinder. Having discharged the latter duty (see title, above), let me take on the former task. My aim in this paper is not merely to rebut Finlay’s critique, but to clarify what it is that the moral error theorist is committed to and how he or she might argue for it.

Finlay states that the moral error theory “is premised on two claims” [2008: 347]:

1) **Presupposition**: moral judgments involve a particular kind of presupposition which is essential to their status as moral;

2) **Error**: this presupposition is irreconcilable with the way things are.

Allowing **Error**, Finlay sets out to attack **Presupposition**. (In this he is not alone; see Dreier, Kirchin, and West—all in Joyce and Kirchin (eds.) [2010]—Prinz [2007], Lewis [1989/2000], Shafer-Landau [2005], and many others besides.) This is what I have called “a concessive strategy” against the moral error theory: conceding that the component of morality that the error theorist maintains is hopelessly flawed is indeed hopelessly flawed, but insisting that moral discourse was never properly committed to this problematic component in the first place. (By comparison, the strategy of accepting (1) and denying (2) I call the “head-on” strategy.)

Finlay’s opening statement that the moral error theory “is premised on” (1) and (2) is ambiguous. If he means that (1) and (2) are premises for a well-known argument for the moral error theory then he is correct. If, however, he means that being an error theorist requires the endorsement (1) and (2) then he is incorrect. (1) and (2) together constitute an argument for the moral error theory. Perhaps it is an unsound argument, but there may be other sound arguments for that position. The failure of (1) or (2) would not imply the falsity of the moral error theory, any more than the failure of the Argument from Evil would show that God exists. One might, for example, reasonably come to endorse a moral error theory if one found

---

1 Alas, Jonas Olson beat me to the punch, with his title to Section 4 of Olson [2010].

2 Page references otherwise unqualified are all to Finlay [2008].
all alternative metaethical views irreparably defective, and such an argument would not involve the identifying of a flawed presupposition.3

Moreover, Finlay proceeds to criticize only one version of the (1)+(2) argument, where the presupposition in question is “absolute authority”—an argument he attributes to John Mackie [1977] and myself [2001]. This seems a major strategic weakness, for it takes little effort to locate other possible flawed presuppositions. It might be that moral discourse presupposes a view of human autonomy which we discover through empirical methods to be flawed [see, e.g., Libet 2004]; perhaps it presupposes a view of human character traits that we discover through experimental psychology to be wrong [see Doris 2002]; or perhaps it presupposes the truth of a kind of internalism that neuroscience and psychopathology reveal to be mistaken [see Roskies 2003]. Finlay partially acknowledges this weakness when he confesses that “it is open to an error theorist to propose a different presupposition as the culprit for the systematic falsity of moral discourse, and … such an error theory would not be vulnerable to the arguments of this paper.” But he immediately adds that “absolute authority is the most familiar and promising candidate for the error theory,” and, as for possible alternatives, he writes: “I suspect that scepticism about absolute authority lies behind many even if not all of them” [351]. Yet Finlay is mistaken about this. Not only is he mistaken in thinking that “absolute authority” lies behind most positive arguments for the moral error theory, he is mistaken in maintaining that it lies even behind Mackie’s original version or my own variant. Finlay quite misidentifies the poisoned presupposition in question.

“The Mackian error theory,” writes Finlay, “claims (a) that moral discourse presupposes the absolute authority of moral value, while maintaining (b) that all genuine value has only contingent authority, which exists only for those with the right psychological orientation towards the relevant standard or end” [ibid.]. It is (a) that Finlay opposes.

Upon first reading this I was surprised to see the argument articulated in terms of “absolute authority.” Mackie talks a great deal about “objective values” and “objective prescriptions,” but hardly ever about “absolute” values or prescriptions. As a term of art, “absolute” is associated with the metaethical notion of absolutism, standing opposed to relativism, which holds that moral claims contain an essential indexical element, such that the truth of any such claim requires relativization to some individual or group that can change from context to context. The vernacular usage of “absolute,” however, need have nothing to do with relativism. An ordinary speaker might claim that the tsunami was “absolutely enormous,” that Kate’s assertion was “an absolute lie,” that a monarch has “absolute authority,” and so on. These uses do not stand literally opposed to relativism. (The tsunami, no matter how large, is enormous only relative to a comparison class.) Thus, it is important that when we see the term “absolute”—even in the works of metaethicists—we do not leap to the assumption that a particular metaethical theory is under discussion.

3 It will be observed that if this is the process by which one becomes an error theorist, one could never be sure that a successful contender won’t show up next week, and thus one’s moral skepticism will be provisional. Quite so; one’s acceptance of the error theory will be proportional to one’s confidence that a successful vindication is not going to arrive. What I am suggesting is that after flicking through a back catalog of failed theories that extends back over two thousand years and involves some of the subtlest minds that humanity has to offer, one might have a fairly high confidence of this. We could call this the “Enough Already!” Argument for moral skepticism.
In order to recognize Finlay’s misidentification of the poisoned presupposition, it is imperative to see that the absolutism vs. relativism dichotomy is orthogonal to the objectivity vs. non-objectivity dichotomy. The enormity of a tsunami may be a relative matter (big relative to ordinary waves, small compared to a supernova), but there is nothing less than entirely objective about the scale. Similarly, if the price of fish for everyone is fixed by a tyrant then there is something less than objective about that value (the truth value of “The fish is worth $5” will be determined solely by someone’s whim), yet this would not be an instance of relativism; there is no indexical that must be consulted—something that alters from context to context—in order to determine the truth value of “The fish is worth $5.”

Thus, when Mackie claims that morality presupposes “objective values” and “objective prescriptions,” he must not be interpreted as claiming that morality presupposes “absolute values” and “absolute prescriptions.” If that is what he meant to say, we can be sure that that is what he would have said. Let us attend to what Mackie did say.

My thesis that there are no objective values is specifically the denial that any such categorically imperative element is objectively valid. [1977: 29]

A hypothetical imperative is a piece of advice on how the subject may better satisfy his or her ends. “Don’t kill babies” might be uttered as a hypothetical imperative if it is offered as advice on how to avoid risking severe penalty (which the addressee greatly desires to avoid). Usually, however, “Don’t kill babies” will not be intended in that cold spirit; it will not be a piece of advice at all—rather, it will be uttered as a categorical imperative. Since the applicability of a categorical imperative does not depend on the addressee’s ends, it is tempting to refer to it as an “absolute” command, inasmuch as there is a certain relation (i.e., between the action and the satisfaction of the subject’s ends) that is irrelevant to a categorical imperative. But this is not to say that categorical imperatives make sense only within the framework of metaethical absolutism, for they may be relativistic. Philippa Foot [1972] showed us how imperatives of etiquette are categorical. The command “Don’t speak with your mouth full” need not be a piece of advice (we are not forced to retract it when we discover that the subject doesn’t care a fig for politeness); and thus, since the relation of the advice to the addressee’s ends is irrelevant, this rule of etiquette has an absolute quality. But it is not an instance of absolutism. The speaker and audience may be well aware that “You ought not speak with your mouth full” is true relative to Western culture but false relative to some other culture (or, if you prefer, that the imperative is “valid” relative to one culture but not valid relative to another4). The same options must be allowed for moral imperatives. When Mackie goes on to say “The objective values which I am denying would be action-directing absolutely” (and this is virtually the only instance of Mackie using the word “absolute” in this key chapter), he is best interpreted as saying that morality has absolute authority in much the same way that a monarch may have absolute authority: making

---

4 Mackie uses the word “valid” in the quoted passage, I think, as a quality that stands to imperatives as truth stands to propositions. Had Mackie been discussing an “ought”-claim at this point (“You ought to φ”) then he would have denied that such claims are ever objectively true. Since, however, he is discussing imperatives (“Do φ”) he instead denies that such claims are ever “objectively valid.”
demands that are inescapable, incontestable, non-negotiable. This is very different from declaring “The objective values which I am denying would be non-relativistic.”

Observe that Mackie nowhere denies the validity of categorical imperatives per se; he is denying the claim that categorical imperatives are objectively valid. What sense can we make of this distinction between “subjective categorical imperatives”—with which Mackie apparently has no beef—and “objective categorical imperatives”—the failure of which he supposes sinks morality? He immediately tries to explain: In any argument that issues a categorical imperative, he says, there must be some input (either a premise or the form of argument) “whose authority or cogency is not objective, but is constituted by our choosing or deciding to think in a certain way” [1977: 29]. Thus categorical imperatives are just fine, thinks Mackie, so long as they know their place: based on “our choosing or deciding to think in a certain way” rather than “part of the fabric of the world” [1977: 16].

The point is made somewhat clearer in Mackie’s later discussion of reasons. Imperatives connect to reasons claims: First, valid imperatives provide warrant for “ought”-claims; second, “X ought to φ” is thought by Mackie to be equivalent to “There is a reason for X’s φing” [1977: 73-74]. A categorical imperative “Do φ” addressed to X would thus imply a reason for X to φ that does not depend on φing promising to satisfy any of X’s ends. If Mackie were out to deny all categorical imperatives, he would presumably also deny the legitimacy of any such reasons claims. And yet he doesn’t do this at all. Suppose Amy comes upon a stranger writhing in agony and there is some action that she could perform to provide relief. “[I]t would be natural,” Mackie says, to claim that the stranger’s sufferings “constitute some reason” for Amy to act—a reason that does not depend in any way on Amy’s desires to help (or desires for the things that her helping might promote) [1977: 78-9]. Mackie explicitly admits these “desire-transcendent reasons,” just as he admits categorical imperatives. What he is adamant about, however, is that such reasons talk is made legitimate only by the presence of an institution: What allows the transition from “There is a stranger writhing in agony before Amy” to “Amy has a reason to help” is a cluster of institutional facts, not brute facts. Institutions have rules of conduct which guide the behaviour and speech of adherents, and transgressions of which are condemned. Importantly, such requirements “are constituted by human thought, behaviour, feelings, and attitudes” [1977: 81], and thus any such requirements are, in a central sense, non-objective.

We are now in a position to restate Mackie’s argument more accurately: The Mackian error theoretic argument claims (a*) that moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical imperatives, while maintaining (b*) that all genuine desire-transcendent reasons are institutional and all genuine categorical imperatives are institutional.

It isn’t easy to assess the extent to which Finlay’s several arguments against the aforementioned premise (a) “Moral discourse presupposes the absolute authority of moral value” also serve against the premise (a*). I am inclined to think that there must be some degree of misfit, if only because I cannot recognize myself in many of the views Finlay attributes to “Joyce (2001).” Note, first, that premise (a*) has no obvious connection to moral relativism, and therefore any arguments designed to refute the claim that moral discourse presupposes absolutism—the kind of absolutism that stands opposed to relativism—miss the target. One might therefore charitably read Finlay’s use of “absolute” in some more broad
sense—as, indeed, a summary of precisely the idea expressed in (a*). However, this doesn’t fit with a great deal of what he goes on to argue; as we shall see later, the focus of his concern really is relativism (and thus the kind of absolutism that stands opposite it). Rather than attempt to untangle and rebut Finlay’s arguments on a point by point basis, let me try to clarify certain key points of the Mackie/Joyce argument, with an eye to defending (a*).

It is common ground between Finlay, Mackie, and myself that “certainly moral judgments are characterized by categoricity in some sense; we do not explicitly condition our moral assertions on agents’ desires or concerns, for example” [349]. Despite Finlay’s grudging tone (“…in some sense”) it turns out that really he is with Mackie and me all the way here, granting that “it is essential to moral judgement as such” that it has categorical force [354]; moral commands are conditioned on the desires and concerns of those to whom they are addressed neither explicitly nor implicitly. Given this agreement, then, the dispute over (a*) turns entirely on whether moral discourse presupposes that the categoricity in question is non-institutional (which I am treating as a reasonable take on what Mackie means by “objective” in this context).

Why do I think that the categorical imperatives of morality are (conceptually) non-institutional? Let us reflect first on institutional categorical imperatives. Foot gave us the example of etiquette, while (as Finlay notes) Mackie discusses the rules of chess, and I appeal to the rules of gladiatorial combat. These are systems of rules that are created by individuals or groups and which can be “applied” to someone regardless of whether that someone is interested or wants it. That the rules may be applied irrespective of the subject’s interests may just be another rule of the institution.

In The Myth of Morality [2001], I tried hard just to motivate in the reader a sense of unease in thinking that morality might be like this. I discussed Plato’s example of Gyges with his ring of invisibility, who sought to satisfy his basest passions by stealing and raping at will. Of course, there are all sorts of prudential reasons that one might give a person as to why he shouldn’t act like this: He’ll end up feeling disconnected from his community, people won’t truly love him, he’ll feel guilty, he’ll get bored, etc., etc. But we are allowed to stipulate the example such that none of these speak to Gyges’ true ends—he is simply depraved and enjoys the fruits of his degenerate behaviour. Because our moral framework is categorical we can carry on legitimately saying “Gyges, you ought not do that!” But if our utterances are merely a verbal output that has been validated by an institution of our own creation, then it all begins to sound rather shrill. We can picture Gyges pausing in some sadistic undertaking, acknowledging to us that, yes, we are speaking legitimately when we assert that he morally ought not act in this way, and then shrugging and carrying on. And if our categorical imperatives are nothing more than an institutionally-backed way of speaking, why should he do otherwise?

It should be stressed that I am not requiring that our moral condemnations should have the force to move Gyges to stop. Maybe his very depravity blocks his capacity to respond to reasonable argument. My point is rather that we in fact have no reasonable argument to offer him. If categorical moral considerations enjoy only institutional backing, then they do not represent reasonable arguments for Gyges (unless by “reasonable” we mean “moral”; but that gets us nowhere). Mackie allows that we can even truly say “Gyges, the suffering of your victims constitutes a reason for you to stop!”—but, again, once Gyges realizes that this reason
is the product of institutional facts—an institution, moreover, to which he does not personally subscribe—then not only will he remain unmoved but it is hard to logically fault him for this.

In Joyce [2001] I tried to pump the intuition that our unease with this scenario leaves us groping for non-institutional categorical imperatives and non-institutional reasons. But what on earth would they be like? And the answer is that I really don’t know. I can honestly report that to the extent that I am familiar with moral judgment I have a very strong feeling that people want and require something more from morality, something objective and non-institutional. We want something that really binds Gyges, such that he is making a mistake by his own standards, even if he cannot be brought to recognize this. I have come to suspect that my inadequacy in articulating this idea is not because of any failure of imagination or eloquence. Rather, morality may be imbued with a deeply mysterious kind of force—a kind of primitive feeling of “being bound by rules and ends” that resists explication. It is as if we have a pre-wired superstition, which—our being the intelligent beings that we are—we cannot quite admit as such (and instead spend two thousand years trying desperately to defend). Perhaps Mackie and I fumble to dissect something that by its very nature cannot be brought into the light to be picked over by philosophical scrutiny.

Finlay claims that Mackie and I explicate this kind of inescapable authority in terms of persons being bound by morality “such that, regardless of their desires and concerns, they cannot disregard it without irrationality” [350]. This gives the wrong impression. I would rather attribute to ordinary thought an extremely inchoate presupposition, using a term like “practical oomph” [Joyce 2006] and possibly providing a bunch of examples like Gyges in order to try and capture the “feel” of moral authority. (And I will be careful to point out that inchoate does not imply dispensable.) With the appropriate accompanying explanations, I am willing to attribute to ordinary moral thought a presupposition about non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical imperatives (though of course I don’t claim that ordinary speakers think in these terms!). The idea that the moral transgressor is irrational has had in my work the status of a hypothesis—a prima facie plausible but ultimately rejected hypothesis—about how an inchoate presupposition might be unpacked in precise and substantive terms. (And, as far as I can see, the claim that immorality presupposes irrationality plays no role in Mackie’s work.)

Although I have no wish to rehearse my argument against moral rationalism as a conceptual claim, something needs to be said to explain some of Finlay’s confusions about my intentions. As we have seen, he seems to interpret me (and Mackie) as arguing basically as follows (“F” for Finlay):

F1) Morality is conceptually nonrelativistic.
F2) In fact, a nonrelativistic morality is indefensible.
∴ The moral error theory is established.

Focusing on (F1), Finlay finds many places in The Myth of Morality where I appear to be arguing resolutely (but, he thinks, unsuccessfully) in its favour. But I do not support the above argument; my arguments against moral relativism, upon which Finlay expends so much critical attention, play a quite different role in the dialectic. Rather, as I indicated above, the argument starts out like this (“J” for Joyce):
J1) Morality conceptually involves non-institutional categorical imperatives.

I then ask what sense can be made of such imperatives, and whether they might be defensible. As a hypothesis, one might entertain:

H) Moral non-institutional categorical imperatives are rational requirements.

I then develop an account of practical rationality, following closely but critically in Michael Smith’s footsteps, coming to the conclusion:

i) Rational requirements are relativistic (in a certain way).

I then argue:

ii) But moral requirements are nonrelativistic (in that way), hence

iii) moral requirements cannot be rational requirements.

At this point I reject hypothesis (H), and, in the absence of any other plausible candidate for defending non-institutional categorical imperatives, feel justified in declaring:

J2) In fact, non-institutional categorical imperatives are indefensible.
∴ The moral error theory is established.

I won’t attempt to make that convincing; I’m just trying to clarify the structure of the argument in light of Finlay’s critique. One certainly will find me attacking moral relativism at some length in Joyce [2001], but this is in the service of supporting (ii), which is directed at sinking (H), the rebuttal of which contributes support to (J2). Should my arguments against moral relativism fail (and I dare say they might), there may well be other reasons to doubt (H) and other sources of support for (J2). ⁵ (In fact, it would seem that Finlay will happily grant me (J2).)

Since Finlay misconstrues my arguments against moral relativism as aiming to provide support for (F1), he thinks that if a kind of moral relativism can be shown to be viable, then the entire master argument for the moral error theory collapses. In Section 2 of his paper, he locates multiple sources of evidence that I have supposedly put forward in support of the first premise of the error theoretic argument, and then proceeds to show how weak this evidence is. His contention is that the error theorist fails to prove his case; all this evidence can be explained just as well by the hypothesis that moral discourse presupposes a non-absolute account of moral value as by the hypothesis that it presupposes the absolute authority of moral value. Given that Finlay declines to lay his cards on the table regarding just what kind of non-absolutism he has in mind, it is mighty hard to compare hypotheses. In any case, I shan’t go through these pieces of evidence in turn, since the points to rebuff and

⁵ In fact, in my 2001 book [67-8, 120-1] I do deploy a different argument against (H) pertaining to the normative content of rationality versus our entrenched desiderata concerning the content of morality. Given the account of practical rationality I endorse, there appears to be a content mismatch sufficient to sink (H).
misunderstandings to clear up are many and complex. Suffice it to say that since the first premise of my and Mackie’s argument is not the one that Finlay attributes to us, and since on those occasions that I do defend the premise that Finlay attributes to us it is in the service of a different (dispensable) argument, much of this debate misses its mark.

What does become clear, however, is that on nearly all occasions that Finlay attempts to show the non-absolutist hypothesis accommodating some evidential datum, to make the explanation plausible he is forced to imagine the speaker unaware of the non-absolutist quality of her conceptual scheme, or suppose this element tacit in her speech and thought. And while of course I agree that people are not always the best judges of what they are talking about, and that the presence of relativizing variables can be tacit, there is something fishy in the recurring need for Finlay to pull this move. The telling evidence is not whether people are thinking in absolute or non-absolute terms when they are engaged in moral thought, but what they make of the non-absolute variable when it is made explicit. Finlay correctly imagines how weird it would be if the All Black captain, in the midst of the rugby huddle, kept relativizing his advice with “…if you want to win the game.” Yes, that would be weird and vaguely irritating. But, I submit, it would be a very different kind of weirdness if the judge at the Nuremberg trials kept relativizing his condemnation of the war criminals with the suffix “…by our moral standards.” This would not just be weird and irritating; it would be scandalous; there would be protests. The All Black captain would be committing the infelicity of redundancy; he would be saying too much. The relativist Nuremberg judge, by contrast, will be interpreted not as adding something unnecessary, but as revealing himself, in adding the suffix, to be saying too little. The displeased audience will want the judge not merely to suppress that suffix in conversation; they will want him to eliminate it.

Part of what would be scandalous about such an explicitly relativistic judge is that he would be locating the locus of our moral condemnation in the wrong place. Were he to say to Hermann Göring “What you did was odious!” then he would clearly be talking about Göring, his actions, and his victims. But when he says to Göring “What you did was odious, from our point of view, then we, the audience, have our attention turned also towards ourselves, in saying which I mean that both our emotive response and our sense of the justificatory source for our feelings shift to encompass ourselves. We would still hate and despise Göring and his actions, of course, but when it is made plain that this condemnation is (only) “by our moral standards” then our feelings may be affected by a discomfiting awareness of the contingency of our judgment.6

We can find more mundane examples of much the same phenomenon in etiquette. When a Westerner hears someone sniffing loudly and wetly in public, this can be rather disgusting. But if it is then observed that the perpetrator is Japanese, and one reminds oneself that such behaviour is not considered such a breach of etiquette in that culture (and that by contrast the Western habit of public nose-blowing is likely to prompt disgust in Japan), then though it is not the case that one’s disgust immediately evaporates (or even necessarily lessens), certainly

---

6 As far as I know, nobody called Göring “odious” at the Nuremberg trials. But the crimes against humanity of which he was convicted were subsequently formally defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) as (inter alia) “particularly odious offenses.” (In the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), which created the legal basis of the Nuremberg trials, “inhumane” was the moral term of choice.)
something shifts in one’s attitude. It is as if one no longer endorses the emotion in the same way. One’s attention has moved from a simple “That’s disgusting!” to something broader and more complex—a questioning of one’s own perspective, an awareness of otherness, a consciousness of contingency.

In short, our emotional response towards someone who has transgressed against a norm which we judge he was objectively bound to follow is extremely different from our emotional response to someone who has transgressed against a norm that we endorse but recognize has only local applicability, and differs yet again from our emotional response to someone who has harmed himself (in frustrating the satisfaction of his ends). In all three cases, the surface form of our utterance may be “He ought not to have done that,” but this linguistic sameness veils important differences. It is not that our negative feelings towards Göring would necessarily be weaker when they flow from a non-absolute judgment, but Finlay seriously overestimates, I think, the extent to which they would remain uninfluenced. How much sounder we might sleep at night were we confident that we hanged the criminal because he did something objectively wrong, as opposed to acknowledging that we hanged him because he did something that we found wrong.

Finlay’s preferred view is that the judge’s relativizing suffix can be left tacit when the standards in question are shared by his audience. And when those standards are not shared, then by suppressing the suffix the judge can perform a rhetorical trick of expressing an expectation or demand that the audience will share those standards [357; see also Finlay 2004, 2005]. But this doesn’t explain the outrage that the audience will feel when the suffix is explicitly added. If Finlay’s analysis were correct, then by adding the suffix the judge causes his condemnation to lose its rhetorical flourish. In that case, the judge should be able to avoid scandalizing his audience by explicitly saying what the rhetoric aims to accomplish: “What you did was odious, from our point of view. And, moreover, I demand that people subscribe to our point of view.” This perhaps sounds a little better, but only, I think, by encouraging an illicit reading. What the judge cannot say is: “...I demand that people subscribe to our point of view because it’s the correct point of view.” To allow this would be to give up on the non-absolutist analysis of the judge’s condemnation. Rather, the judge is simply demanding subscription. Now, the audience is likely to approve in general of the judge’s demanding subscription to moral standards. They are in the presence of someone (Göring) who, we are imagining, cares not a jot for morality, so saying to him “Subscribe to morality!” seems like a reasonable demand (though putting it in these terms manifests the usual philosopher’s clunkiness). But note that this is in fact not what the judge would be saying; he would be demanding “Subscribe to our morality!”—and now we are back where we started. The audience will balk: “No, we’re not just telling Göring to subscribe to our morality; we’re demanding that he subscribes to the real morality.” By comparison, the audience will not balk if instead of relativizing matters to a particular moral standard, the judge were explicitly to eschew all such relativization: “What you did was odious, irrespective of one’s moral standards” [see Olson 2010]. It would be astonishing if adding “…irrespective of standards” raises no eyebrows, but adding “…relative to our standards” prompts outrage, while in fact it is the latter kind of suffix that is really in play tacitly. And yet this is what Finlay would have us believe. It is, in short, implausible that when we morally condemn we leave off the
relativizing suffix solely in order to achieve rhetorical effect; it is much more plausible that we add no relativizing suffix because there is none.

Many philosophers have given up on trying to make sense of moral objectivity because, like myself, they have come to see that this “fugitive thought” (as Foot called it) is unlikely to be found. It is perfectly reasonable that forms of non-objective revisionism should be explored, but Finlay’s claim that moral speakers have never been much interested in moral objectivity in the first place is one that I find deeply implausible. Metaethicists who make this latter claim often betray their own declared position by undertaking every convolution and distortion possible to squeeze every last drop of ersatz objectivity from their favoured theory. What metaethicist has ever turned down a scrap of objective authority the accommodation of which could be claimed for his or her theory? If morality had never been concerned with objectivity in the first place, why this seemingly compulsory ritual that every metaethicist embarks upon of emphasizing all elements of his or her theory that lean in the direction of objective authority and downplaying all elements that lean away?

Suppose I am correct that speakers really have been “much interested in moral objectivity.” Finlay is willing to concede as much for the sake of argument (though he continues to refer instead to “absolutism”). In his final section he argues that “even if such an assumption is ubiquitous, we still have good reasons to conclude that it does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral discourse, and hence that its falsity does not make moral judgement systematically false” [348]. So Finlay changes tack from trying to show that the error theorist has failed to make his case to trying to show “that the error theory is actually false” [360].

This touted killing-blow argument takes a while to arrive. After several diversions, the meat of Finlay’s case is finally presented over three pages (i.e., pp. 365-7). By this stage he has usefully laid out a few contrast cases. On the one hand, we have examples where an error theory seems clearly correct: witches and phlogiston. On the other, we have examples where, although in the past we have held seriously false beliefs about the topic, an error theory seems wrong: motion and water. In the latter cases, our erroneous beliefs can be extirpated without bankrupting the subject matter; in the former cases, the erroneous beliefs “infect” the whole concept. Finlay is, at this point in the proceedings, conceding for the sake of argument that we have ubiquitously held erroneous beliefs about morality. So, as I once put it [Joyce 2001: 96]: “The question we must ask is: ‘Is moral discourse more like talk of witches or more like talk of motion?’—and the answer is that it is more like talk of witches.” Finlay agrees upon the question but disagrees with my answer.

He alights upon my claim that the matter turns upon what “the point” of the discourse in question is. If moral concept M contains erroneous claim E, and transparently eliminating E would leave concept M*, then can we use M* in all or most of the ways that we heretofore used M? If not, then we have strong ground for thinking that M essentially presupposes E. My

---

7 First, Finlay indicates that some form of “content-externalism” will sink the error theory, then, just as the case is developing, announces that he thinks that content-externalism is implausible for morality and so drops it. Second, he expounds arguments against moral fictionalism, which is, though a thesis that I have advocated alongside and in response to the error theory, entirely dispensable to the case for the latter. If one is going to criticize my case for the error theory, then let it be assumed, arguendo, that I am agnostic between fictionalism and eliminativism.
claim, then, is that a normative discourse for which categorical imperatives were transparently institutional (and desire-transcendent reasons transparently institutional) could not be used in many of the ways we use moral discourse, and therefore would not be a moral discourse. (It would at best be a schmoral discourse [see Joyce 2007].) This is ultimately an empirical claim, and it has not been tested. But the kind of thoughts I was attempting to pump above, concerning how we feel about Gyges or about the relativist judge at Nuremberg, are designed to give us a premonitory hunch about how those facts might pan out.

We will not get far until we have a decent handle on to what uses we do put morality, and this too is an empirical question. (I have offered speculations in the past, but I bow to the tribunal of our best evidence.) Finlay presumes that I intend to invoke only the “referential point” of morality [364], but I must confess that I don’t quite know what this means. I agree that there may be many “points” to moral discourse; my position is that many of these make sense only if we take ourselves to be referring to non-institutional values and prescriptions. The point—or better, a point—of punishing Göring is to gain satisfaction in seeing him get what we think he deserves—where the kind of desert in question is embedded in a meaning-conferring conceptual scheme according to which Göring’s actions were objectively wrong, not merely wrong from our perspective.

Finlay claims that just as “the absolutist about motion makes (what look like) substantially the same first-order motion judgements as the rest of us [who are sensible motion relativists], … the absolutist about morality makes (what look like) substantially the same first-order moral judgements as the rest of us” [365]. But this is precisely the claim about which I am doubtful. And while it may be true that I haven’t said enough to ground this doubt persuasively, by the same token Finlay hasn’t said enough simply to help himself to the claim. (And relative to the ambition of showing that the error theory “is actually false,” his argument requires that he dispels this reasonable doubt.) He goes on:

> Assuming there is no genuine absolute motion, or genuine absolute moral properties, the absolutist’s judgements could not be responsive to these fictional properties. Rather, his judgements about motion are responsive to his sensitivity to motion relative to particular frameworks, and his judgements about moral wrongness are responsive to his sensitivity to the relation of actions to certain moral standards or ends. [365]

On one reading, this is probably platitudinously true. No matter what moral judgment Abe makes, we can probably locate a framework of “standards and ends” relative to which his judgment is true. But this isn’t really what Finlay wants, for the aim is not to ensure that Abe’s moral judgments must come out as true. Even if Abe is a decent person, Finlay will want to allow that his moral judgments (just like his judgments of motion) are on occasion false. I suppose this is why Finlay doesn’t claim that the absolutist’s moral judgments are always “responsive to the relation of actions to certain moral standards or ends,” but rather adds an extra step: they are “responsive to his sensitivity to” this relation. Even when the absolutist makes a mistake—and thus fails to be responsive to the relevant relation of actions to a certain framework of ends—he is still responsive to his sensitivity for tracking a real, albeit non-absolute, realm of fact. Why, then, should we not just see the absolutist as employing the non-absolutist moral concepts all along?
I suspect that lurking in the background of Finlay’s thinking is a quantifier-shift fallacy. It may be true that for every absolutist judgment Abe makes, there exists some non-absolute property (pertaining to a framework of ends relative to which his judgments may be assessed) to which he is manifesting a sensitivity, but it does not follow that there exists some non-absolute property (etc.) to which Abe is manifesting sensitivity every time he makes an absolutist moral judgment. But it is the latter claim, the $\exists x \forall y$ proposition, of which Finlay needs to convince us. He wants to maintain that there is some non-absolute standard relative to which a person’s absolutist moral judgments can be uniformly assessed. Now, it is possible that this claim is true, but Finlay cannot get it for free simply on the basis of the platitude that people make moral judgments and there will nearly always be some instantiated relational property to which each judgment can be interpreted as a response.

Finlay sees the obvious flaw in this whole line of thinking, and tries valiently to fix it. The flaw is that even for those topics for which an error theory seems obviously correct (witches and phlogiston), when people in the past made these judgments there was probably some kind of instantiated property to which their judgments could be interpreted as a response. In the case of witches, I once suggested that the instantiated property (if there is one) might be that of “playing a certain disruptive role in the patriarchal society” [Joyce 2001: 96]; Finlay prefers: “a complicated disjunctive property including, for example, the property of being a woman whose enemies have suffered illness and misfortune” [366]. But locating such a property wouldn’t lead us to overrule our witch skepticism. So Finlay’s attempt to drive a wedge between witches/phlogiston and motion/water, such that morality clearly falls on the latter side, by his own admission initially fails.

His “fix” is to distinguish between judgments that are responsive to (what we take to be) evidence of their instantiation, and judgments that are responsive to that which is (we take it) constitutive of their instantiation. Witches and phlogiston are supposed to be of the former type, and motion (and presumably water) of the second type. With his new wedge driven in, Finlay again expresses confidence that morality clearly falls on the latter side.

Serious problems emerge, however. In the witch case, we are invited to observe that competent users of the concept witch will have no trouble conceiving of a situation where the standard evidence of witchcraft obtains, but the accused is not a witch, or of a situation where none of the standard evidence obtains (no wart, no black hat, no sick enemies) but in which a woman is a witch nonetheless. [366]

Fair enough. But I fail to see a distinction with morality in this respect. Let’s just re-run the quote again, but this time for morality:

Competent users of the concept moral wrongness will have no trouble conceiving of a situation where the standard evidence of moral wrongness obtains, but the action (say) is not morally wrong, or of a situation where none of the standard evidence obtains (no apparent suffering, no hurtful intentions) but in which the action is wrong nonetheless.

There seems nothing dodgy about that to me. But Finlay thinks otherwise, arguing that it is “not nearly as plausible” that moral judgments “could be sensitive to what a person takes to
be merely evidence for the realization of "absolute properties (which are in fact nonexistent) [366]. In explaining this, he makes the curious claim:

Consider that the "evidence" in each case [both motion and morality] is the relational property that the relational theory identifies with morality or motion. [366].

But why is that the evidence? In the above paraphrase for the moral case, I listed as "standard evidence" such things as apparent suffering and hurtful intentions. (That was just a flavour of a real answer—but it will do for present purposes.) It seems bizarre to me that instead it is the relational property in question that Finlay counts as evidence. This table may help clarify matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The evidence</th>
<th>The (possibly) instantiated property</th>
<th>The uninstantiated property</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WITCHES</td>
<td>e.g., testimony about a woman’s suspicious behaviour, accusations from upstanding citizens, coerced confessions, etc.</td>
<td>“a complicated disjunctive property including, e.g., the property of being a woman whose enemies have suffered illness and misfortune” [366]</td>
<td>being a woman who can cast spells and has entered into a pact with the devil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORALITY</td>
<td>e.g., the presence of suffering and selfish intentions, etc.</td>
<td>non-absolute relational property pertaining to the action’s bearing on the speaker’s ends</td>
<td>absolute moral property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the witch case, Finlay clearly distinguishes these three categories (though for the first box he instead mentions pointy hats and warts⁸), but in the morality case, the first column seems to pass unnoticed and instead the non-absolute relational property (2nd column) is treated as the “evidence.” This is perplexing. I cannot see why Finlay supposes that the error theorist might be the least tempted to impute to ordinary moral speakers the tendency to treat the instantiated relational property as evidence for an absolutist property (which is in fact uninstantiated). Rather, the error theorist thinks that ordinary speakers treat things like suffering and selfish intentions as evidence for the presence of an absolutist property (which is in fact uninstantiated). Perhaps these things like suffering and selfish intentions are in fact reliable indicators of the presence of some instantiated relational property; but the error theorist has reasons for thinking that this relational property will not transparently serve in place of the uninstantiated absolutist property.

I do not see that things stand any differently in the witch case. The error theorist about witches (i.e., us) thinks that superstitious speakers in the past treated things like testimony about a woman’s suspicious behaviour, accusations from upstanding citizens, coerced confessions, and so forth, as evidence of the property of witch-hood (which is in fact uninstantiated). Perhaps these kinds of things were in fact reliable indicators of the presence

⁸ I take it that he wasn’t being entirely serious at this point.
of some “complicated disjunctive property” that the accused women really did instantiate; but
the error theorist (i.e., us) has reasons for thinking that this complicated disjunctive property
will not transparently serve in place of the uninstantiated property of being a witch.

If Finlay insists on making the odd claim that error theorists think that ordinary people
treat the non-absolute relational property as evidence of the presence of an absolute moral
property, one can just counter with the no less odd claim that ordinary people treat the
complicated disjunctive property (which all women accused of being witches in fact
instantiate) as evidence of being a witch. In either case, no asymmetry has been exposed.

It should be stressed that this is really the pivotal moment in Finlay’s argument. The
lengthy preliminaries, the careful distinctions, the twists and turns—all don’t amount to too
much, since at the point immediately prior to this he has admitted that “something has gone
wrong here” with his argument; he has seen that the error theorist still has a wide open escape
route. (In fact, it’s not as if the error theorist has had to dodge and weave and then finally
glimpses a way out; this “escape route” could have been described by the error theorist at the
outset.) And yet at the crucial moment where Finlay is supposed to slam the door on that
escape route, as far as I can see he has no well-structured or convincing argument to back up
the rhetoric. I should emphasize that I do not take myself on this occasion to have said
anything convincing about why the moral case must go with witches and phlogiston rather
than motion and water; my intention is simply to refute an argument that purports to provide
decisive support for morality going with motion and water.

However, it may be that in advocating these claims I am merely manifesting the
blinkering influence of an upbringing in a “melting pot made up of immigrants from a wide
variety of backgrounds” [368]—a peculiarly Australasian misfortune that has clouded my
capacity to think clearly on these matters. I say this in response to the curious closing portion
of Finlay’s paper where he aims to analyze why the moral error theoretic stance is a
“characteristically antipodean view” [347]. At the risk of being impolite, I think his comments
are most charitably interpreted as a joke. If one were to entertain such wild ad hominem
speculations, one could just as easily attribute to the antipodean error theorist a kind of
courage to sincerely question deeply entrenched human beliefs in the face of overwhelming
opposition: a courage born of the spirit of those plucky Anzacs confronting a deeply
entrenched enemy in the hills of Gallipoli. One might with as much warrant claim that the
antipodean error theorist’s refusal to kowtow to conservative forces finds its origins in the
tenacious self-sufficiency of the early pioneering families, in the fierce autonomy of Ned
Kelly and Hone Heke. But oh what silly arguments those would be.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

REFERENCES:

Cambridge University Press.

8/3: 205-23.